Climate change mitigation policies that raise energy prices may damage the international competitiveness of manufacturing industries if enforced unilaterally. In this paper we evaluate these concerns by investigating the effect of energy costs on exports. Existing studies in the literature focus on the role of direct energy costs, computed on the basis of direct energy consumption (that is, energy consumption at the final stage of production) and domestic energy prices. Using multi-country input-output information, we measure the effect of aggregate energy costs on export performance, where aggregate energy costs include not only direct energy costs but also indirect energy costs passed on through the upstream supply chain. We use a two-step approach to estimate a theory-consistent empirical model for a panel dataset of 10 manufacturing sectors in 41 countries during 1991 to 2013. We find that ignoring input-output relationships leads to a strong bias in the estimated impact of direct energy costs on exports. After controlling for indirect energy costs, we find statistically significant and negative effects on trade for both direct and indirect energy costs. We also demonstrate the economic importance of indirect energy costs by simulating impacts of energy cross-subsidies and carbon taxes.
Introduction
The impact of climate change mitigation policies on economic competitiveness is often subject to close scrutiny and debate. One channel through which such policies can affect the economy is regulation-induced energy price adjustments. For example, environmental taxes and permit trading systems raise the cost of using fossil fuel sources of energy, while renewable mandates increase production from renewable sources of energy that are often more expensive than non-renewable energy sources. 1 By raising energy prices, the unilateral implementation and enforcement of these policies may hinder the ability of industries to compete in export markets, especially in the short term and for energy intensive production. This raises a challenge for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in the absence of global climate regulation, because firms may respond by moving production to countries where emission constraints are less stringent, increasing global carbon emissions -the socalled carbon leakage effect. Hence, provisions that guard against the relocation of industry have been included in climate policies such as the EU Emissions Trading System. 2 In this paper, we examine the effect of energy costs on manufacturing exports. 3 Our main contribution to this line of inquiry is to use input-output linkages to consider the role of intermediate goods. Academic evidence suggests that intermediates are very important for production and trade (Hummels et al., 2001; Johnson and Noguera, 2012) . Hence, we consider not only direct energy costs, calculated on the basis of direct energy consumption and domestic energy prices, but also indirect energy costs involved in the production of an industry's intermediate inputs to production. Even if a sector is not energy intensive on the basis of direct energy consumption, it may be vulnerable to energy price shocks that are passed on through the supply chain, especially if it is reliant on energy intensive inputs. Furthermore, a sector which utilizes imported intermediate goods may be indirectly affected by energy price changes in foreign countries. Including the indirect impact of energy costs on trade may therefore allow for a more nuanced understanding of the energy-1 Sato et al. (2015) find evidence that industrial energy prices are highly correlated with the stringency of emissions reduction policy. 2 The EU Emissions Trading Scheme offers a higher share of freely allocated emission permits to certain energy intensive sectors, while electricity-intensive sectors can be compensated for increases in electricity costs through national state aid schemes.
3 Changes in energy prices could also affect transportation costs, which in turn has implications for international trade flows. Analysis on this aspect is beyond the scope of this paper.
trade relationship than considering direct energy costs alone. Indeed, our analysis suggests that indirect factor costs have an important effect on trade, and if this channel is ignored then it can lead to biased estimates of the direct effect.
A small, recently emerging literature provides empirical evidence on the effect of energy prices on international trade. This literature focuses mostly on the role of direct energy costs alone. For example, Aldy and Pizer (2015) investigate how U.S. production and net imports change in response to energy prices using historical electricity price data. Sato and Dechezleprêtre (2015) study the impact of changes in energy price differences between trading partners on trade flows using energy price indices from 42 countries during 1996-2011. In addition, Panhans et al. (2016) use a discrete choice model to examine whether electricity costs drive the relocation decisions of European firms. These studies find a statistically significant but small impact of energy costs on trade. A possible explanation is that direct energy costs are a relatively small share of total production costs for the majority of manufacturing sectors.
Another strand of literature uses input-output analysis to examine the energy content of production. The findings of this literature emphasise the importance of indirect energy input through intermediate goods, and in particular imported inputs. For example, Bordigoni et al. (2012) find that the energy embodied in imported intermediate inputs is close to the total direct energy consumption of European industry. A significant part of the embodied energy costs of manufactured products in Europe is therefore not affected by domestic energy price changes. In addition, Sato et al. (2016) evaluate the impact of embodied energy on energy security. They find that the geographical diversity of embodied energy imports is much greater than that of direct energy imports, and there is considerable variation across countries in the diversification of embodied energy imports.
In this paper we use inter-country input-output tables in order to model the inter-sectoral linkages in the global supply chain. We use this approach to measure energy costs as a function of both direct energy consumption and energy prices, and upstream energy consumption and energy prices. To the best of our knowledge, the only other paper in the literature that takes indirect as well as direct energy costs into account is Arezkia et al. (2017) . They consider the impact on the production and trade patterns of U.S. manufacturing of lower U.S. natural gas prices due to the onset of the shale revolution. They find that it has led to a 10 percent increase in the energy intensity of U.S. manufacturing exports. However, their approach to capturing indirect energy costs differs substantially to ours. Arezkia et al. (2017) focus on adding up indirect natural gas consumption within the U.S. economy, while we model trade in intermediate goods using global input-output linkages. In addition, our indirect costs include both upstream consumption and prices, and are measured for three factors of production (electricity, natural gas and labor).
We utilize a theory-consistent gravity model to estimate the effect of energy costs. Theory tells us that it is important to control for expenditure by importing and exporting countries and trade costs between two countries. Furthermore, the seminal work of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) emphasizes that when modeling biltaral trade flows it is important to control for the multilateral resistance of trade frictions with all trading partners, as it is the relative trade costs that influence trade flows. Many trade costs and demand shocks are unobserved and they are likely to be correlated with our covariates, raising concerns with endogeneity. To circumvent this, we use a two-step estimation strategy outlined in Head and Mayer (2015) that allows us to employ fixed effects that are consistent with the theory and properly control for the multilateral resistance term, while estimating how energy costs impact trade flows.
Our theory-consistent two-stage estimation strategy is developed as follows. The first stage is a structural gravity estimation using ad-valorem tariff rates and a set of theory-consistent fixed effects. These include exporter-sector-time and importer-sector time effects, alongside country-pair effects to control for fixed bilateral trade resistances (including distance, language and cultural differences). The second stage regression then uses the estimated fixed effects from the first stage as dependent variables, and the covariates include the multilateral resistance along with the costs of factor inputs. In particular, the costs of factor inputs are the direct and indirect costs of electricity, natural gas and labor, computed using the OECD inter-country input-output tables for 10 manufacturing sectors. The results are compared to those obtained using only the direct costs of factor inputs. We use lagged costs rather than contemporaneous costs to limit endogeneity concerns due to simultaneity. The second-stage regression also includes fixed effects to control for time-varying shocks at the country and sector level (such as exchange rate fluctuations, regulatory and technology changes). The second stage is estimated using a panel dataset for 41 countries from 1991 to 2013.
We find a statistically significant effect of both direct and indirect energy costs on exports.
When only direct costs are included as covariates, the coefficients are positive, suggesting the energy cost terms are potentially endogeneous. However, once we include indirect cost terms, both direct and indirect energy costs are negative and statistically significant.
Our results imply that by ignoring input-output linkages, even if one is interested in direct costs only, will bias the estimates on direct costs. We find that a one percent increase in the exporter's aggregate electricity costs is on average associated with a 0.13 percent decrease in exports, ceteris paribus. Aggregate natural gas costs also have a significant impact on trade, although of a smaller magnitude. Our results are robustness to a variety of different specifications and assumptions, including different measures of input-output linkages, different sets of fixed effects from different first stage regressions, using trade intensity instead of exports as the dependent variable, and estimating the effect of energy costs in a single step estimator.
Based on the estimated elasticities, we assess the economic consequences of removing energy cross-subsidies, which translates into a 15% unilateral decrease in electricity price in each exporting county, and a carbon tax that unilaterally increases the energy price by 10 percent in the EU. We find that by considering aggregate costs, the predicted impact on exports can increase by two to ten times, depending on the domestic share of intermediate goods. The estimated impact of a carbon tax in the EU leads to a 0.01% decrease in exports and a 0.02% increase in imports, with non-EU countries predicted to have opposite effects, when we consider direct costs only. Our estimates rise to a 0.16% decrease om exports and a 0.34% increase in imports if we consider indrect costs as well. Our results suggest input-output relationships are important for understanding the energy-trade relationship.
Some sectors use significantly more indirect energy than direct energy. For these sectors, when intermediate goods are mostly non-traded, a country's own price change may have a substantial multiplier effect on its exports through domestic sectoral linkages. Conversely, if indirect energy is mostly imported, changes in domestic energy prices would be relatively less important for a sector's export position. In the case of EU regulation leading to an EU-wide increase in energy costs, we find a model that only accounts for direct energy consumption would underestimate the impact of higher energy prices on EU-wide net export by a factor of two. This is because there is intensive trading of intermediate goods within the EU which increases each sector's exposure to higher energy prices through regional multiplier effects.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly outlined theoretical framework, deriving our estimation equation. Section 3 discusses our empirical approach and how we incorporate indirect costs in our econometric analyses. Section 4 describes sources of data and presents descriptive statistics. Section 5 shows our estimation and simulation results. Finally, section 6 concludes.
Theoretical Background
To inform the econometric analysis of the effect of energy prices on trade, we first build a Melitz-type model where there are multiple countries and sectors, and firms are heterogeneous in productivity. This framework largely follows the existing literature (including Eaton and Kortum (2002) , van Wincoop (2003, 2004) (2015)). Since the theoretical model itself has been analyzed in detail before, we will keep the exposition brief with further detail and working provided in Appendix A.
We consider a partial equilibrium framework where each sector uses its own factors of production. To begin with, we assume there are no linkages between sectors and so only the direct costs of factor inputs have an impact on trade. In the following, countries are indexed by i,j and sectors are indexed by k. In total there are N countries and K sectors, and we treat input prices as exogenous.
The representative consumer has a two-tier utility function where the upper-tier follows a Cobb-Douglas form and the lower-tier follows constant elasticity of substitution (CES) preferences. Formally, the utility function for the representative consumer in country j is given by:
where
Here β j k is sector k's share of the consumption of the representative consumer, ω represents each variety, Ω is the entire variety space, and σ k is the elasticity of substitution for varieties within sector k. Each firm must pay a fixed cost for each variety, has increasing returns and has no extra cost to horizontally diversify. Therefore, firms in each country produce their own variety, or in other words each variety is sourced from one country only. We therefore can rewrite (2) as:
where Ω ij,k is the variety space in sector k that country j imports from country i. Both Ω
and Ω ij,k will be endogenously determined, as described below.
Assume that the representative consumer in country j receives an income of Y j . The total export value (of good k with variety ω) from country i to country j is given by:
where P j,k is the price index for sector k in country j, defined as:
where p ij,k (ω) is the price charged by each firm ω.
Each firm pays a fixed cost of producing and exporting of f ij , and a variable cost of production depends on the cost of M factors. Firm productivity is drawn from a Pareto distribution with shape parameter γ k . The marginal cost of production in country i and sector k is denoted W i,k and the iceberg transport cost between trade partners is denoted τ ij .
Under these assumptions, we can derive from equation (4) the following expression for aggregate exports X from country i to country j in sector k (see Appendix A subsection A.1):
We implement equation (7) in our empirical model, which we describe in section 3. We then extend the theoretical model so that each sector purchases intermediate goods produced
by other sectors as measured by the input-output linkages. This extension to the theoretical framework is outlined in Appendix A sub-section A.2. In this case the estimation model will look very similar to equation (7), although W i,k is replaced with W i,k , which now includes the costs of factor inputs at all stages of production. That is, W i,k represents sector k's own input costs as well as the input costs in sector k's upstream supply chain. Hence, the set of estimation equations for the K sectors derived from (7) are now inter-linked rather than independent. This approach allows us to estimate the effect of both direct and indirect energy costs on exports. We discuss in subsection 3.1 on how we are using the input-output matrix to compute the aggregate cost of factor inputs as a function of factor input prices and factor intensities.
Empirical Approach
Our empirical model measures the effects of electricity, natural gas and labor costs on bilateral exports at the sector level, and is derived directly from equation (7). 4 The first term on the right-hand side of equation (7) takes into account the demand side factors while the fourth term takes into account the bilateral trade costs between countries i and j. We control for these two terms in the empirical model using fixed effects. The main variable of interest is the second term on the right-hand side of equation (7), W i,k , which is the direct cost of factor inputs facing sector k in country i. Later in this section we explain how we extend this model to include indirect as well as direct costs. Finally, the theory implies that the price index, P j,k , depends on all bilateral resistances, and so is captured in the empirical model by the multilateral resistance variable.
To ensure a theory consistent estimation method, we are mindful of the need to control for exporter-sector-time and importer-sector-time fixed effects. However, our energy cost variables also vary along this dimension. The two-step estimation strategy outlined in Head and Mayer (2015) provides a solution to this problem. 5 In particular, the two-step approach allows us to measure the impact of energy costs on trade while properly controlling for the multilateral resistance term and employing theory-consistent fixed effects. The first stage is a structural gravity estimation which takes the following form:
where Exports ijkt represents annual bilateral trade flows between the exporting country i and importing country j in sector k in year t. Tari f f ijkt measures bilateral tariff barriers to trade, which we expect to have a negative association with exports. α ikt are exporter-sectortime fixed effects and α jkt are importer-sector-time fixed effects. In particular, α ikt controls for the production costs on the exporter side, while α jkt controls for expenditure and the CES consumer price index on the importer side. Both terms also control for multilateral resistances in exporting and importing countries. Finally, α ij are country-pair fixed effects which control for fixed bilateral trade resistances (including distance, language and cultural differences). We also consider specifications where we allow the α ij fixed effects to change in response to a change in preferential trade agreements between countries i and j. This controls for the effects of trade agreements and allows these effects to be heterogeneous across country-pairs.
After estimating equation (8), the estimated fixed effect α ikt is then used as the dependent variable in the second regression, where the covariates include a multilateral resistance variable, along with the variables of interest (electricity costs and natural gas costs) and controls:
where MR is a measure of multilateral resistance or remoteness, which we define shortly.
Cost consists of ElectricityCost, NaturalGasCost and LaborCost which measure the direct unit input costs of electricity, natural gas and labor, respectively. We expect these cost terms to have a negative effect on the fixed effect (and in turn exports). The cost terms are calculated by interacting input prices with intensities, defined as input expenditure per unit of value added. Hence, the empirical strategy reflects that the effect of energy prices on trade is conditional on the energy intensity of the sector. Since electricity and natural gas prices are observed at the national level, it is the interaction with the intensity of use that generates inter-sectoral variation and allows the coefficients β q to be identified. Equation (9) also includes φ it to control for time-varying shocks at the country level (such as exchange rate fluctuations, infrastructure investments, and regulatory and technology changes), while φ kt controls for time-varying shocks at the sector level. In addition, the control variable X includes a measure of gross economic output of sector k in exporting country i. Economic size controls for the possibility that the volume of exports is higher the bigger the scale of the sector. Finally, ε ikt is the idiosyncratic error term, clustered at the exporter-year level.
By using direct input costs in equation (9), we ignore input-output linkages between sectors. However, higher factor prices may increase the cost of producing intermediate inputs,
and these costs may then be passed on by input suppliers. Furthermore, if a sector's intermediate inputs are imported then domestic costs of production depend on the factor prices and factor intensities of these foreign-produced intermediate inputs. As suggested by theory, a change in production costs due to an adjustment in the price of intermediate goods may affect bilateral trade flows. This implies that equation (9) may suffer from an omitted variable bias because it does not include the indirect costs passed on through the supply chain. Therefore, we consider specifications which include indirect costs as well as direct costs. Subsection 3.1 explains how indirect costs are calculated using the inter-country input-output tables.
Other than the potential omitted variable bias described above, there are two main endogeneity issues with the econometric estimation of equation (9). First, our cost terms comprise of energy intensity which is calculated on the basis of energy consumption. Hence, demand shocks that impact both trade and energy consumption simultaneously will potentially bias our results. 6 While our use of fixed effects means that our estimates will 6 Indirect costs are calculated on the basis of indirect energy consumption and so it could be argued are less only be affected if the unobserved demand shocks are both country-specific and heterogeneous across sectors, such that they vary at along the ikt dimension, we remain concerned by this point. To address this issue with an instrumental variables approach, one would require exogenous instruments for energy costs with wide country availability as well as cross-sectoral and time-series variation. Such instruments are not readily available. In the absence of plausible instruments, we run specifications with lagged cost variables in order to limit any contemporaneous endogeneity. This approach is also taken by other studies in the literature on energy prices and trade, such as Aldy and Pizer (2015) . Second, sector output may also be endogenous. To address this concern, we estimate specifications where energy intensity is the dependent variable, defined as the ratio of exports to output.
There are various approaches to measuring the MR term. Baier and Bergstrand (2002) and
Carrere (2006) use aggregate data and therefore construct a GDP-weighted measure of remoteness as a proxy for multilateral resistance. In this paper we take a similar approach, although we require a sector-specific weight. Therefore, we use a weight θ based on expenditure by country j on output in sector k, which we hold constant over the sample period to mitigate against any endogenous adjustment of the weight. Hence the MR is calculated as follows:
where ∑ N j θ jk = 1 for all k. σ is the elasticity of substitution and we assume σ = 4 in computing equation (10), although the results are robust to the conventional range of elasticities between 2 and 6. We expect the MR variable to have a positive effect on bilateral trade flows -holding costs constant, a higher MR will lead a country to trade more with a given bilateral partner because there are greater trade resistances with all other trading partners.
For the simulation analysis, we also estimate the second stage equation for the importer side using the α jkt estimated in the first stage as the dependent variable. In this case equation (7) implies that the CES consumer price index should be included instead of production costs.
Nonetheless, it could be argued that the CES price index is also a function of production costs in a general equilibrium setting. Therefore we use both approaches. When we use price indices we construct these as follows:
likely to be susceptible to this bias than the direct cost terms.
where θ is defined analogously to its definition in equation (10), and Cost ikt is the sum of electricity, gas and labor costs. We consider the robustness of the results to defining Cost ikt either as the direct cost only, or aggregate costs (i.e. sum of direct and indirect costs) in the calculation of the price index. In addition, we define MR in the same way for the importing country as we do for exporters.
The two-stage framework is estimated using data from 1991 to 2013. We use trade and tariff data for 60 countries in our first stage regression, and in the second stage the sample is 41 countries which reflects the availability of energy price and consumption data. 7 As well as being theory-consistent, the first stage regression has the advantage of being a balanced panel. Both stages are estimated using OLS. 8 It is also possible to estimate both stages in a single step, by substituting equation (9) (2015), we consider the single-step approach as a robustness test. However, due to missing data for the covariates in the second stage regression, this approach will lead to a loss of information and an unbalanced panel when compared to the first stage regression (8) in the two-step approach. Another potential disadvantage to the one-step approach is that it may produce a biased estimate of the effect of the Tari f f ijkt variable if it is correlated with the ε ikt error term in the second-stage regression. Hence, the two-step approach is our preferred specification.
Methodology for Computation of Aggregate Costs
Given that we observe the inter-country input-output linkages at that sectoral level, we assume that each sector in each country produces a specific intermediate good. Each sector uses outputs from other sectors (including its own sector) as intermediate inputs, that is, there are N × K intermediate goods. In this case the Cobb-Douglas cost function for sector 7 We also consider running the first stage regression on the subset of 41 countries available for the second stage regression. Our results are fully robust to using this subsample of countries in the first stage.
8 Alternative estimators for bilateral trade flows have been widely used in the literature and may offer some advantages over OLS, such as the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) proposed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) . However, we found our estimation strategy, and in particular the very large number of fixed effects, to be too demanding for such alternative estimators. An advantage of our OLS estimator is that it efficiently absorbs the fixed effects and ensures the model is computationally feasible. k in country i can be written as:
where W is the cost of direct factor inputs and P j,s is the price for intermediate inputs produced by sector s in country j, α s,j,k is sector k's intensity of intermediate good produced by sector s in country j . Thus in total there are NK + 1 inputs to production. Taking logarithms on both sides of equation (12):
The price of intermediate goods from sector s of country j (P j,s ) is assumed to be sum of production costs and a markup, i.e. P j,s = (1 + η j,s )C j,s , where η j,s is the markup:
Substituting equation (14) into equation (13) gives:
Equation (15) can be rewritten in matrix form as the following:
where elements within A include the α terms (i.e. input-output linkages between sectors), and the elements within H include the markup terms. The first item on the right hand side of this equation calculates the dot product of β and W. Assuming that the mark-up H can be controlled for by the set of fixed effects, equation (16) can be rewritten as the following by dropping the markup term:
Using the input-output relationship (matrix A), factor intensities of all sectors (vector β) and a vector of input prices W, we are able to compute the aggregate (i.e. direct plus indirect) cost of factor inputs using equation (17). The indirect cost alone can then be calculated by taking the difference between this aggregate cost and the direct cost term as calculated in equation (9) (i.e. the interaction of factor intensities and input prices).
We then include both the direct cost and indirect cost terms in the input-output extended model, as well as considering the effect of the aggregate (i.e. direct plus indirect) cost.
To address concerns that intersectoral linkages are endogenous, we use the input-output This means that the input-output relationships cannot shift in response to changing input prices, which may otherwise bias our regression estimates. Also, we do not account for substitution possibilities among direct factors and intermediate inputs. A consequence of these assumptions is that we interpret the results from the input-output extended model as an estimation of short-term effects, and our results can be interpreted as a lower bound.
Data

Data Sources
We estimate our empirical model using energy and bilateral trade data for 10 manufacturing sectors in 60 countries from 1991 to 2013 in the first stage. In the second stage when the regression is restricted to the set of countries where there are data available on energy prices and energy consumption in each sector, the number of countries in our sample drops to 41.
The full set of these countries is listed in Table 1 .
We obtain data on electricity and natural gas prices from the International Energy Agency (IEA) energy prices and taxes database, the Energy Regulators Regional Association (ERRA)'s Tariff Database and various government and media reports. The IEA database records aftertax prices for residential and industrial consumers, while the ERRA database records aftertax prices for residential and non-residential consumers. A subset of 9 countries are covered by both IEA and ERRA. We cross-check price data for this subset of countries and find that data from the two datasets are fairly consistent. We use IEA industrial energy price data whenever they are available. We use ERRA non-residential energy price data for one country (Saudi Arabia) that is not reported by IEA. Table 2 lists the sources of energy price data for each country.
Energy consumption data are obtained from the IEA World Energy Statistics and Balances database. The database reports final electricity and natural gas consumption of 10 manufacturing sectors at the two-digit level of the international standard industrial classification Revision 3.1 (ISIC Rev. 3.1). One of the sectors is labelled as 'non-specified' which according to IEA documentation includes rubber and rubber products, and any other manufacturing activities not covered by the other nine sectors. Since there may be measurement error associated with energy intensity of this miscellaneous category, we conduct robustness checks by excluding the 'non-specified' sector from the sample. 9 We use data on the value added of manufacturing, employment costs and number of em- We use the input-output tables to compute expenditure shares to be used in price indices and multilateral resistance terms, described in section 3. An alternative source of interna- Tariff data are downloaded from the UNCTAD Trade Analysis Information System (TRAINS).
TRAINS contains most-favoured nations (MFN) rates and preferential rates at the product level. In the case of missing data, we supplement the tariff data from the tariff database from the World Trade Organization and interpolate missing tariffs using known trade agreements in the Global Preferential Trade Agreements Database (GPTAD). We then aggregate the advalorem tariffs from the product level to the sector level, using total trade values into the importing country as weights. 12
Manufacturing value added, employment costs, export value and energy prices from IEA and ERRA are reported in current prices denominated in US dollars. Energy prices from government reports are reported in current prices denominated in local currencies. We convert local currencies into US dollars using exchange rated reported by the World Bank. We then convert values for different years into 2010 prices using country-specific GDP deflators 11 For non-manufacturing sectors, we aggregate them up to agriculture, fisheries, mining, construction, transport and service sectors. Energy consumption data for these sectors are gathered from the IEA database mentioned above. 12 We also gather exchange rate information from the World Bank and use them in the first stage regression, but it does not show a statistically significant effect conditional on the set of fixed effects so we omitted it.
obtained from International Monetary Fund database. Table 4 provides summary statistics of the key variables. Table 5 describes how intensively each row sector uses inputs from column sectors. These intensities represent the weighted average share of factor inputs across all countries in 2010. While most producers rely on inputs from sub-sectors within the producer's own 2-digit sector, there are strong interdependencies among the machinery, transport and metals sectors. 13 For example, for the manufacturing of transportation equipment, 12 percent of inputs are from metals and 24 percent of inputs are from the machinery sector. Table 6 lists average direct factor intensity and indirect factor intensity by sector. Table 6 shows that for sectors that heavily rely on intermediate goods from energy-intensive sectors, there is substantial difference between direct and indirect factor intensities. For example, the indirect energy intensities for machinery and transport sectors are three to four times higher than their direct energy intensity. Hence, ignoring indirect energy consumption would significantly underestimate the aggregate energy costs faced by these sectors. There is also Table 7 shows the correlation between the direct and indirect electricity, gas and labor costs. Table 7 shows there is a strong correlation between some direct and indirect costs, even across different factors of production. For example, there is a strong negative correlation between direct electricity costs and indirect labor costs (-0.55 ) and between direct labor costs and indirect electricity costs (-0.51). These findings suggest that it may indeed be important to control for indirect costs, for all factors of production, in order to accurately measure the effect of direct energy costs on trade in the regression analysis. Table 8 reports the results from the estimation of the first stage structural gravity equation (8) repeats the specification in column (2) but now excludes the miscellaneous ("non-specified") sector from the sample to ensure the results are robust to potential measurement error in this category. Finally, column (4) estimates a dynamic version of the specification in column (2) where export performance is determined by its realisation in the previous time period. This specification is estimated using GMM to account for the endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable. In these regressions there are more exporting countries (60) than importing countries (57) due to missing data on the tariff variable. Depending on the specification, the total number of observations (or bilateral trade flows) varies between 537,454 (in columns 1 and 2) and 483,781 (in column 3). Table 8 shows that the ad valorem tariff has a negative effect on bilateral exports in all specifications, in line with our a priori expectations. The estimated coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent level in column (1) and at the 5 percent level in column (2) and (3), although it is insignificant in the dynamic specification (4). Columns (1) to (3) suggest a trade cost elasticity equal to between -0.5 and -0.7. This magnitude is relatively small in comparison to findings elsewhere in the existing literature. For example, Head and Mayer (2015) summarise the findings of 32 papers and find the median trade cost elasticity for structural gravity models to be -3.78, although they also report a very large variance observed in the estimates. Our estimated elasticities are likely to be relatively low because identification is only on the basis of variation along the country-pair-sector-year (ijkt) dimension, with the fixed effects absorbing much of the variation in tariff rates. For all specifications, the R 2 s in-dicate that over 80 percent of the variation in export performance is explained by the model, which is expected given the many fixed effects included to control for omitted variables.
Descriptive Statistics
Empirical results
Regression results
Using the estimated exporter-sector-year (ikt) fixed effects from our preferred specification (2) in Table 8 as the dependent variable, we then estimate the second stage equation (9) above. The results are given in Table 9 . Column (1) reports the results when we consider only the direct costs of factor inputs, alongside the multilateral resistance term and sector output to control for the economic size of the sector. Column (2) extends this specification by including indirect factor input costs as well as the direct costs. Higher indirect factor costs can reflect higher domestic costs, higher costs in upstream trading partners, or a combination of both, depending on the structure of the industry's supply chain. In contrast, higher direct costs only reflect higher domestic costs. In addition, column (3) estimates the effect of the aggregate factor cost (direct plus indirect) on bilateral trade. For all three specifications, the factor cost terms are lagged one period in order to mitigate any contemporaneous endogeneity. This specification also captures the possibility that bilateral trade may not respond to price changes immediately due to market imperfections or adjustment costs. (Results using a contemporaneous specification are similar and reported in B.1 in Appendix B.) Given that our cost variables consist of interactions between factor prices and intensities, the magnitude of the impact of a factor price change on exports depends on the factor intensity. To ease interpretation of the coefficients, all factor intensities (direct and indirect) are normalised by their sample average, so that the factor intensity of an average sector equals 1. This means that the coefficients on factor costs can be interpreted as the estimated percentage change in bilateral exports for a 1 percent increase in the factor price for the average sector. Table 9 shows that the results for the direct cost model are counter-intuitive (see column 1).
In particular, the positive and significant coefficient on direct electricity costs suggests that higher electricity costs in an exporting country raise that country's volume of exports. This goes against the predictions of the theoretical model, which suggests that higher production costs erode a country's comparative advantage and are therefore negatively associated with exports, as shown by equation (7). The estimated effect of direct natural gas and labor costs are also unexpectedly positive in column (1), although they are not statistically significant. However, column (2) suggests that these counter-intuitive results are driven by an omitted variable bias arising from the exclusion of the indirect factor cost terms. In particular, including indirect electricity, natural gas and labor costs results in the expected negative signs on all direct and indirect costs. Furthermore, the negative coefficients on all cost terms are statistically significant at the 1 percent level in all models. Hence, these results are reassuringly consistent with our a priori expectations.
The coefficients estimated in column (2) of Table 9 suggest that a 1 percent increase in the exporter's direct electricity price is associated with a 0.13 percent reduction in exports (via the fixed effects), evaluated at the sample mean electricity intensity. The magnitude of the indirect electricity price is similar, with a one percent increase leading to a 0.11 percent reduction in exports. The difference between the estimated effect of direct and indirect electrcity costs on trade is not statistically significant.
[Check] Electricity prices are found to have a larger impact on bilateral trade than natural gas prices. Column (2) indicates that a 1 percent increase in direct (indirect) gas prices is associated with a 0.05 (0.07) percent reduction in export performance. As with electricity prices, the magnitude of the effect of direct and indirect gas prices is very similar. Meanwhile, labor costs are found to have a much larger effect on international trade flows than either electricity or natural gas costs. A one percent increase in the direct (indirect) price of labor leads to a 0.36 (0.37) reduction in exports.
Column (3) of Table 9 reports the findings for the aggregate cost model. Here we find the results from column (2) are robust. In particular, the aggregate costs are all the expected negative sign and are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. As the aggregate cost terms combine both the direct and indirect costs into a single term, it is reassuring that signs on the aggregate costs are similar in magnitude.
Our findings from Table 9 are also consistent with the findings of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) in that the multilateral resistance term is positive and statistically significant. One potential concern is that sector output is likely to be endogenous. This may be a particular concern in the case of export-oriented sectors where an increase in export flows may need to be met by more production at home. As a robustness check, we move sector output to the left-hand side of equation (8) and redefine our dependent variable as export intensity, that is, the ratio of export and sector output. The results for both the first and second stage regressions using this specification are reported in Table 10 . The results are robust, suggesting the potential endogeneity of sector output is not affecting our findings.
We find very similar coefficients in terms of sign, significance and magnitude, which is expected given that the estimated trade elasticity of sector output in Table 9 is close to one.
Overall, these findings support the message that omitted indirect costs can lead to biased estimates of the effect of direct costs on trade, especially in the case of direct energy costs. Table 11 estimates the model in a single step by substituting equation (9) 
into equation (8).
Columns (1) to (3) are similar to the specifications estimated using the two-step procedure, with characteristics of the importing countries controlled for using importer-sector-year (jkt) fixed effects. Column (4) includes fewer fixed effects by replacing the jkt fixed effects with jt and jk fixed effects. In this case, we introduce the CES consumer price index and the multilateral resistance on the importer side (both of which vary along the jkt dimension), to be consistent with the predictions of the theory. Again, the findings are robust. We also estimate the second stage for the importer side using the jkt fixed effects from our preferred specification (2) in Table 8 as the dependent variable. The results are shown in Table 12 . We again find that we obtain biased results when only direct costs in the importing country are included. However, the inclusion of indirect costs in the importing country j leads to the expected positive effect of country j's costs on country i's exports into country j.
Finally, we consider a variety of robustness tests to the second stage findings. The results are reported in Table 13 . In this table, column (1) repeats our preferred results for the second stage direct and indirect cost model (i.e. column (2) from Table 9 ). We refer to these results as the baseline. In comparison to the baseline, column (2) excludes the other sector. Column (3) allows the input-ouput tables to vary over time rather than holding the IO table fixed at their value in 1995. Column (4) uses different IO tables from the WIOD, fixed in the first available year (2000) . Columns (5) and (6) allow σ to equal 2 and 6 respectively in equation 10. Columns (7) and (8) show the second stage results using the first stage fixed effects estimated in columns (1) and (3) in the first stage regression shown in Table 8 . Column (9) in Table 13 constrains the sample to cover the time period 2000 -2013 shows second stage results when the first stage is constrained to equal the same subset of 41 countries available for the second stage regressions. Overall, the results are very robust to these alternative specifications. The only exception is column (4), where the MR term is much smaller and not statistically significant. One possible explanation is that the sample countries included drops from 41 to just 33.
Simulation analysis
Next we analyze the economic consequences of two energy policies using estimated trade elasticities reported in Section 5.1. 14 We begin by considering an unilateral change in electricity prices for one country, and estimate its effect on its own exports -and we do that for each country in our sample. It is of policy relevance for two reasons. First, carbon tax on greenhouse gas-emitting industries and utilities, or any policies that increase renewable energy share, are going to increase marginal cost of electricity and price of electricity. Second, many emerging economies impose energy cross-subsidies place an implicit tax on industries to subsidize households' electricity bill. For example, in India, industrial electrical prices are on average 15 percent higher than the cost of supply in order to support lower tariffs for domestic and agriculture consumers. India also displays a strikingly low level of import and export of intermediate goods, as seen in Figure 1 . Simulation analysis is going to show that a country's level of participation in a global value chain significantly affects the correlation between domestic energy price shocks and exports. Figure 2 shows the impact of a 15% unilateral decrease in electricity price on exports for each country. Using results from column (2) in Table 9 , we also simulation two effects: (1) if only direct costs are affected (i.e. there are no changes in indirect costs in the counterfactual); and (2) if both direct and indirect costs are affected by the change in electricity price. There are two implications to draw attention to in Figure 2 . First, the effect on trade is much higher when we consider both direct and indirect costs. Most predicted impact on trade is less than 0.5% if only direct costs are controlled for, and it shows the economic significance of controlling for indirect costs for policy simulations. Second, the effect is much higher for countries that rely on its own production for intermediate goods. At the two extremes (Hungary and Japan), while the predicted impacts based on direct costs are of the same magnitude (0.1%), simulated impacts based on aggregate costs are drastically different (0.87% versus 1.84%). 15 To put this in perspective, removing a 15 percent implicit electricity tax on industry would increase India's exports by 2.45 percent, or around $1.5 billion US dollars per year. Since India is quite self-reliant in terms of the production of intermediate inputs, there are multiplier effects of energy price shocks accumulated along the supply chain. A baseline model that only considers energy requirements at the final stage of production therefore underestimates the impact of energy price shocks by almost a factor of ten.
Next, we consider a multilateral increase in energy costs by considering trade implications of carbon pricing for the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). EU ETS created the world's first and largest carbon market. A number of countries outside Europe, such as the United
States and China, have adopted similar programs as well. Carbon trading schemes put a price on carbon emissions and would increase the cost of fossil-fuel based energy in countries where such trading regimes are in force. There is concern that a unilateral adoption of carbon regulation could lead to carbon leakage. Indeed, European Commission considers energy and trade intensive sectors face a higher risk of carbon leakages. To protect their competitiveness, these sectors are granted a higher share of free emissions allowances.
The EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) offers a higher share of freely allocated emission permits to certain energy intensive sectors, while electricity-intensive sectors can be compensated for increases in electricity costs through national state aid schemes. To gauge the potential magnitude of carbon leakage, we simulate the impact of a 10 percent unilateral electricity and gas price increase in EU on overall exports from EU. Table 14 describes the effects of a 10 percent across-board increase in electricity and natural gas prices on exports of EU and non-EU countries. Exports decline for all sectors in the EU.
Similar to the case for unilateral price increase, when aggregate costs are being considered, the model predicts a larger decline than the model with direct costs only for each sectorwhen we consider indirect costs, predicted decrease in exports rise from 0.01% to 0.16%. Our results with direct cost closely aligned ones found in Sato and Dechezleprêtre (2015); when we consider the effect of carbon tax on aggregate costs, our predicted impacts are much larger. This prediction reflects multiplier effects within the EU as EU firms intensively trade intermediate goods within the EU border. It also translates to an opposite effect on the non-EU countries: an increase in their exports by 0.20% and a decrease in their imports by 0.13% 16 ; as a result, the carbon tax in the EU causes carbon leakage by increasing exports in unregulated part of the world.
Conclusion
This paper seeks to contribute to the literature by taking into account the effect of embodied energy costs (the cost of direct plus indirect energy consumption) on trade competitiveness.
We start with the premise that energy price shocks not only affect the cost of direct energy We identify a robust effect of energy costs on export performance. We use the estimated trade elasticity to simulate two counterfactuals: (1) removing energy-cross subsidies in India and Bulgaria and (2) a unilateral increase in energy prices by 10 percent in EU. We find that removing a 15 percent implicit electricity tax on industrial consumers could increase India's exports by 2.45 percent, or 1.5 billion USD dollars a year. In addition, a carbon tax that increases energy prices by 10 percent in the entire EU could cause an EU-wide reduction in exports by 0.16 percent a year, accompanied by an increase in imports by 0.34 percent a year. These effects are much bigger than predictions in Sato and Dechezleprêtre (2015) . Table 9 and column (2) in Table 12 . Note: correlations are computed using sample observations used in estimation of the second stage regression. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable for the second stage is the ikt fixed effect estimated in column (2) in Table 8 . All explanatory variables are in logs. All regressions estimated using OLS. Aggregate is the direct plus indirect cost. * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 (5) is the jkt fixed effect estimated in column (2) in Table 8 .
All explanatory variables are in logs. All regressions estimated using OLS. Aggregate is the direct plus indirect cost. * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 
(8) (1) in Table 8 FE from (3) in Table 8 Year Note: The table lists predicted changes in exports in 2010 in EU and non-EU, after a 10% increase in both the electricity prices and natural gas prices across the EU. The simulation is done using results in models (2) in Table 9 and (2) in Table 12 , based on actual trading volume in 2010. Non-EU averages are based on the list of non-EU countries in the sample.
Online Appendices
A Theoretical Framework
In this appendix we show how the we derive our empirical equation for estimation from our theoretical framework. In the first subsection, each sector uses a bundle of factors at different factor intensities. However, there are no linkages amongst sectors. Each sector produces its good using M factors and each sector can be analyzed separately. In the second subsection, we further relax this restriction and allow each sector to use all the factors as well as intermediate goods from other sectors.
A.1 Many Sectors and Factors
Each firm pays a fixed cost of exports (and production) f ij , and a variable cost of production depends on the cost of M factors. In equilibrium, each firm chooses to export to only one country due to increasing returns. The total cost for a firm in country i, producing quantity q and ship to country j, is given by: 17 where m = 1, 2, ..., M denotes each primary factor, τ is iceberg transport cost between i and j, ϕ is the productivity term drawn from a continuous distribution function G k (ϕ), α m,k is the factor intensity in m, which is allowed to be different from sector to sector, and meets the following condition ∑ m α m,k = 1; w m,i is the input price for factor m in country i, and the firm is assumed to be a price taker in the factor markets. Assume that all factors are used in a perfectly competitive, non-tradable, homogenous-good sector in all countries and that the returns to factors, w, are pre-determined. Define W i,k ≡ ∏ assume that firm productivity follows a Pareto distribution:
where γ k is the shape parameter. Due to the fixed costs of exporting, the low productivity firms will choose not to produce and export (extensive margins). Applying the demand and price functions described in equations (4) and (A.2) and setting profits equal to zero, the cut-off productivity is therefore:
where A σ k is a parameter which depends on σ k only. The aggregate exports from i to j in sector k is given by
Substituting (4) Taking logarithmic transformation on both sides give:
The first term of equation (A.7) takes into account the demand side factors while the fourth term takes into account the bilateral trade cost between countries i and j. The second term, log W i,k takes into account the input costs facing sector k in country i. Namely,
α m,k log(w m,i ) (A.8) which is the main variable of interest in our empirical model.
The third term, log P j,k , represents the multilateral resistance term first defined in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) . The price index in the importing country, as illustrated in (5) After incorporating intermediate goods, the estimation model will look almost exactly like equation (A.7) except that we will now replace W i,k , which represents the costs of primary factor inputs (costs of the factor inputs at the last stage of production), with W i,k , which includes costs of factor inputs as well as costs of the factor inputs at all stages of production).
The set of estimation equations for the K sectors derived from (A.7) are now inter-linked and are no longer independent. In other words, price indices {P i,k } depend on input costs of other sectors. In the next section, we explain how to use input-output matrix to compute the embodied cost of factor inputs which is a function of factor input prices and factor intensities. Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable for (1) to (3) is the ikt fixed effect estimated in column (2) in Table 8 . All explanatory variables are in logs.
B Further Robustness
All regressions estimated using OLS. Aggregate is the direct plus indirect cost. * , * * , * * * denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
